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ARTICLE
DRAFTING, INTERPRETING, AND
ENFORCING COMMERCIAL AND
SHOPPING CENTER LEASES'
JOHN M. TYSON2
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the International Council of Shopping Centers,
56% of all retail sales are derived from businesses located within a
shopping center.3 General practitioners representing small retail
1. An earlier draft of this Article was presented at the North Carolina Bar
Association Commercial Real Property Seminar, March 1992. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research and preparation assistance by Marcelina K.
Crisco, a former student and 1992 law graduate of Campbell University.
Appreciation is also expressed to Dean Patrick K. Hetrick for his research,
support, review and comments on the outlines and drafts of this article.
2. Real Estate Director and Counsel for Revco Drug Stores, Fayetteville,
N.C., and Adjunct Professor of Law, Campbell University. His principal areas of
practice are zoning, land use planning, landlord and tenant contracts, real prop-
erty, commercial transactions, and leasing. He is also a member of the Virginia
and North Carolina Bars and author of "The Philosophy of Negotiation," Retail
Leasing Reporter, May 1990. Tyson received his B.A. from UNC-Wilmington in
1974, his J.D.-cum laude from Campbell University School of Law in 1979, and
his M.B.A. from Duke University in 1988.
3. New Members of Congress Need to Know About ICSC Issues, Govern-
ment Affairs Report, Volume 15, Number 3, September 1992, at 6. Specifically,
this article recites the figure of 56% as the amount of all non-automotive retailing
275
1
Tyson: Drafting, Interpreting, and Enforcing Commercial and Shopping Cen
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
business clients are very likely to be faced with reviewing and in-
terpreting a commercial or shopping center lease.
The attorney's role in commercial real estate transactions re-
quires a greater use of the counsellor portion of the license to prac-
tice law. In negotiating, the successful attorney will learn how to be
a deal maker, not a deal breaker. In reviewing documents, a clear
understanding of your client's ultimate goals is critical.'
A lease is a conveyance of real property that creates an estate
for a term, or at will. To be valid, a lease must contain four essen-
tial elements. The first element is the identity of the landlord and
tenant. Both the landlord and the tenant must have the capacity
to enter a binding contract. The second element is a description of
the leased premises. The description can be by reference to an ex-
trinsic document which describes the property conveyed with suffi-
cient certainty. The third element is an agreement on duration of
the term. The fourth and final element is the rental or other con-
sideration to be paid.
A lease does not have to be in writing or under seal to be
valid.' However, in North Carolina, the Statute of Frauds requires
all leases of more than three years in duration to be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged. 7 This provision has been inter-
preted to mean "the one against whom relief is sought."8
North Carolina's recordation statute, the Conner Act, states
that:
no lease of land for more than three years shall be valid to pass
any property interest as against lien creditors or purchasers for a
valuable consideration from the donor, bargainer, or lessor but
from the time of registration thereof in the county where the land
lies .... 9
that is conducted in shopping centers.
4. The rights and obligations of landlord and tenant to a residential lease are
now primarily governed by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-38 to § 42-44 (1991).
This presentation shall only address selected leasing issues in a non-residential
context. The designation of landlord will be used to describe an owner, grantor or
lessor, while the designation of tenant will be used to describe the lessee, grantee
or occupant.
5. J.A. WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA, §§ 232-
236 (Hetrick, 3rd. ed. 1988) (Patrick K. Hetrick and James B. McLaughlin, Jr.,
eds.).
6. Moche v. Leno, 227 N.C. 159, 41 S.E.2d 369 (1947).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1991).
8. Lewis v. Murray, 177 N.C. 17, 19, 97 S.E. 750, 751 (1919). Kent v. Hum-
phries, 50 N.C. App. 580, 584, 275 S.E. 2d 176, 180, aff'd and modified, 303 N.C.
675, 281 S.E.2d 43 (1981).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1991).
[Vol. 14:275
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This statute has been interpreted to require the party assert-
ing a superior right to be a bona fide purchaser for value. The pres-
ence and importance of notice by the party asserting a superior
right over a prior, but non-recorded, interest by the tenant has
been subject to differing interpretations in North Carolina. 10
Where a successor to the landlord has actual prior notice of ten-
ant's possession and leasehold, and acted with fraudulent intent or
where tenant's interest was mistakedly omitted from the recorded
instrument, courts preserve the tenant's interest.
The statutes also provide a method for recordation of memo-
randa of leases and options.
A lease of land ... may be registered by registering a memoran-
dum thereof which shall set forth:
1. The names of the parties thereto;
2. A description of the property leased;
3. The terms of the lease, including extensions, renewals, options
to purchase if any; and
4. Reference sufficient to identify the complete agreement be-
tween the parties.1"
II. THE LEASE AS A CONVEYANCE
The traditional and majority rule regards a leasehold interest
as a conveyance of lands or tenements to an entity (tenant-lessee)
from another in rightful possession (landlord-lessor) for a term of
years or at will."2
Under this rule, a tenant gains the status of an owner for the
term. The tenant has the right to use or not to use the property for
any lawful purposes, so long as the lease does not compel or re-
strict use. The common law does not favor restraints on the use of
10. Simmons v. Quick Stop Food Mart Inc., 307 N.C. 33, 296 S.E.2d 275
(1982); Bourne v. Lay & Co., 264 N.C. 33, 140 S.E.2d 769 (1965); but see, Terry v.
Brothers Inv. Co., 77 N.C. App. 1, 334 S.E.2d 469 (1985); State Bank Co. v. Braz-
nell, 227 N.C. 211, 41 S.E.2d 744 (1947).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-117, 118, 120 (1991). Accord Fuller v. Southland
Corp., 57 N.C. App 1, 8, 290 S.E.2d 754, 759 (1982).
12. WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at §272-273, citing Carolina
Helicopter Corp. v. Cutter Realty Co., Inc., 263 N.C. 139, 143-144, 134 S.E.2d 362,
366 (1964) and Stallings v. Purvis, 42 N.C. App. 690, 694, 257 S.E.2d 664, 667
(1979).
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land. 3 Therefore, any restraints on alienation of property are
strictly construed.' "
The main duty of a tenant is to pay rent. This obligation is an
independent covenant, and is not excused by wrongful acts or
omissions of the landlord, or by damage to or destruction of the
leased premises by acts of God or by third parties. In addition to
paying rent, a tenant must not waste or abuse the property and
must maintain, repair, replace and rebuild the premises in the ab-
sence of an agreement to the contrary.15
Unless otherwise agreed, it is the landlord's duty to pay
taxes.1 " However, a tenant who occupies land without a rental obli-
gation has the duty to pay taxes."7
The landlord also has an implied duty to provide quiet enjoy-
ment for tenant."' This implied covenant protects a tenant against
"[u]nauthorized entry and repossession of the leased premises by
the lessors or those acting under their direction."' 9 Other duties of
landlord include putting tenant into possession ° and mitigating
damages.2 '
The common-law principle of caveat emptor warns the tenant
and continues to govern commercial lease transactions. 2 Case law
places the duty to inspect on the tenant.2 The landlord does not
impliedly covenant fitness of the premises for a specific purpose or
13. WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 288.
14. Buckner v. Hawkins, 230 N.C. 99, 52 S.E.2d 16 (1949) (restraints on
alienation are void); but see Smith v. Mitchell, 301 N.C. 58, 61, 269 S.E.2d 608,
611 (1980) (reasonable restraints are permissible).
15. Chambers v. North River Line, 179 N.C. 19, 102 S.E. 198 (1920). WEB-
STER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 286. Rowe v. Great A&P Tea Co. Inc.,
46 N.Y.2d 62, 385 N.E.2d 566, 570, 412 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831 (1978).
16. WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 289, (citing Cordell v.
Grove Sand & Stone Co., 247 N.C. 688, 693, 102 S.E.2d 138, 142 (1958)).
17. Willard v. Blount, 33 N.C. 624 (1850).
18. Oestreicher v. American National Stores, 290 N.C. 118 225 S.E.2d 797
(1976).
19. Andrew & Knowles Produce Co., Inc. v. Currin, 243 N.C. 131, 135, 90
S.E.2d 228, 230 (1955).
20. Sloan v. Hart, 150 N.C. 269, 63 S.E. 1037 (1909).
21. Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274, 278, 142 S.E. 12, 15 (1928); WEBSTER'S
REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 285.
22. Harril v. Sinclair Refining Co., 225 N.C. 421, 425, 35 S.E.2d 240, 242
(1945); WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 243.
23. Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454, 461, 181 S.E.2d 787, 791, cert. de-
nied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E.2d 241 (1971).
278 [Vol. 14:275
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III. THE LEASE AS A CONTRACT
The minority and emerging view interprets a lease as an exec-
utory contract in addition to being a conveyance of a-leasehold in-
terest. "Leases share the qualities of both contracts and convey-
ances and are interpreted as are other agreements unless there is a
conflict with principles of property law."'2 5 "A lease is in the nature
of a contract and is controlled by the principles of contract law."'2 6
North Carolina continues to follow the majority rule, stated earlier,
that a leasehold interest is a conveyance of an estate in land.
IV. GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
A written agreement is presumed to embody all of the parties'
negotiations. The parol evidence rule provides "that in the absence
of fraud or mistake or allegation thereof, parol testimony of prior
or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations inconsistent
with the writing or which tend to substitute a new or different con-
tract from the one evidenced by the writing is incompetent.2 8
A contract is to be interpreted as written, and "if there is no
dispute with respect to the terms of the contract and they are
plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction. '29 The
reason for enforcement of agreements as written and the courts'
reluctance to vary or add to a lease or other contract is because
"[a] lease agreement, like any other contract, involves a bargained-
for exchange between the parties. Absent some violation of law or
transgression of a strong public policy, the parties to a contract are
basically free to make whatever agreement they wish, no matter
24. Smithfield Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N.C. 255, 259, 72 S.E.
312, 314 (1911).
25. Century Shopping Center Fund I v. Crivello, 456 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1990), petition for rev. denied.
26. Mercury Investment Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 529 (Okla.
1985).
27. WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 230.
28. People's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Mayfair, N.V., 50 N.C. App. 442, 447, 274
S.E.2d 365, 368 (1981); Accord Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d
523, 529 (Okla. 1985).
29. Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 30 N.C. App 84, 86, 226 S.E.2d 232, 234
(1976), (citing Kohler v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 20 N.C. App. 486, 490, 201
S.E.2d 728, 731 (1974)). Accord Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd., 87
N.C.App. 438, 361 S.E.2d 608 (1987) [hereinafter Mosley 1].
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how unwise it may appear to a third party. °30
In Neal v. Marrone,-1 the North Carolina Supreme Court
stated:
where the parties have deliberately put their engagements in
writing in such terms as import a legal obligation free from uncer-
tainty, it is presumed the writing was intended by the parties to
represent all their engagements as to the elements dealt with in
the writing. Accordingly, all prior and contemporaneous negotia-
tions in respect to these elements are deemed merged into the
written agreement.32
Where a contract is complete in itself and, as viewed in its en-
tirety, is unambiguous, its language is the only legitimate evi-
dence of what the parties intended. The intention of the parties
cannot be determined from the surrounding circumstances but
must be gathered from a four-corners examination of the contrac-
tual instrument in question. 3
If an ambiguity arises, the lease will be construed against the
party who drafted the document. In Columbia East Associates v.
Bi-Lo, Inc., 4 the court stated, "[w]here the contract is susceptible
of more than one interpretation the ambiguity will be resolved
against the party who prepared the contract."35
Further, in North Carolina, a successor-in-interest to the party
who drafted the lease is subject to the obligations of its predeces-
sor. The court of appeals found no error in a trial court instruction
that "the lease should be construed against the party who drafted
the instrument ... [even though the current landlord] . . .did not
in fact draft the lease agreement."3
Some courts go even further and hold that a lease must be
construed favorably to the tenant and against the landlord. In Da-
vis v. Wickline, 7 the Virginia Supreme Court held "a contract of a
lease is to be construed favorable to the lessee and against the.les-
30. Rowe v. Great A&P Tea Co., Inc., 385 N.E.2d 566, 568 (N.Y. 1978).
31. 239 N.C. 73, 79 S.E.2d 239 (1953).
32. Id. at 77, 79 S.E.2d at 242 (1953). Accord Peoples Service Drug Stores,
Inc. v. Mayfair, N.V., 50 N.C. App. 442, 447, 274 S.E.2d 365,.368 (1981).
33. Mercury Investment Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 529 (Okla.
1985) (emphasis in original).
34. 386 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
35. Id. at 262.
36. Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd., 97 N.C. App. 511, 525,
389 S.E.2d 576, 584 (1990) [hereinafter, Mosley II].
37. 135 S.E.2d 812 (Va. 1964).
[Vol. 14:275
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sor."8 A U.S. district court, applying Louisiana law under the Erie9
doctrine, stated: "Louisiana jurisprudence has developed a strong
tradition of interpreting any ambiguity in a contract of a lease
against the lessor and in favor of the lessee, regardless of which
party prepares the lease. ' 40 In Carl A. Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger
Co.,"1 the court stated that "[u]nclear portions of a lease are con-
strued against the lessors, unless the lessee drafted it." In this case,
Kroger, the tenant, drafted the lease, but the court held that the
presumption of free alienability of land overrode construing the
lease against Kroger.
A corollary rule of construction is that a lease will be strictly
construed against forfeiture. The court stated that a lease provi-
sion that could cause forfeiture of the leasehold estate must be
stated in terms so clear and explicit that no other construction is
possible.42
A further basic rule of contract construction is that the pur-
poses of a contract must not be illegal nor violate public policy.
The courts will look at what is fair, reasonable and just. "[Tihe law
has developed the concept of unconscionability so as to prevent the
unjust enforcement of onerous contractual terms which one party
is able to impose upon the other because of significant disparity in
bargaining power (e.g. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302)" 3
Closely related to the concepts of illegality and unconscionability is
the canon of construction that contracts in restraint of trade are
strictly construed."
V. CONSTRUING SPECIFIC EXPRESS LEASE PROVISIONS
A threshold construction question to be considered by the
court is whether the lease is a fully integrated document. The more
detailed, complete and specific the written agreement appears, the
more likely a court will find that it contains all the agreements of
38. Id. at 814.
39. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
40. Coxe v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 652 F.Supp. 64, 65 (M.D. La. 1986); Accord
Cascade Drive Ltd. Partnership v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir.
1991) (also applying Louisiana law).
41. 317 N.W.2d 606, 607 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
42. Davis v. Wickline, 135 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Va. 1964).
43. Rowe v. Great A & P Tea Co., Inc., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1978).
44. James C. Greene Co. v. Kelley, 261 N.C. 166, 167, 134 S.E.2d 166, 167
(1964).
1992]
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the parties. In People's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Mayfair, N. V.,, 5 the
lease contained the following merger clause:
this instrument embodies all the agreements between the parties
hereto in respect to the premises hereby leased, and no oral
agreements or written correspondence shall be held to affect the
provisions hereof. All subsequent changes and modifications to be
valid shall be by written instrument executed by the landlord and
tenant."6
The court held "this clause is evidence of the intention of the par-
ties to the lease that it constitutes their entire agreement, and that
conflicting oral agreements should not be allowed to vary its
terms."' 7
Analogous to a merger clause is an entire agreement clause. In
Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons Inc.,"8 the trial
court refused to allow parol evidence on the ground that it would
contradict the express terms of the lease. The applicable lease pro-
vision provided:
Landlord has made no representations or promises with respect
to the demised premises except as herein expressly set forth. This
lease contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto;
and any agreement hereafter made shall not operate to change,
modify, terminate or discharge this lease in whole or in part un-
less such agreement is in writing and is signed by the party
sought to be charged therewith.' 9
The plaintiff asserted fraud, but the court upheld the exclusion of
the parol evidence because it related to representations of future
events.
A. Assignment and Subleasing
A provision controlling assignment and subleasing of the de-
mised premises is found in many commercial leases. An assignment
is a conveyance of a tenant's entire interest in the property, while a
sublease is a conveyance of only part of the term of the lease. In a
sublease, the original tenant retains a reversion of some portion,
45. 50 N.C. App. 442, 274 S.E.2d 365 (1981).
46. Id. at 449, 274 S.E.2d at 369.
47. Id.
48. 164 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super. 1960).
49. Id. at 788.
[Vol. 14:275
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however short, of the original term of the lease. ° In North Caro-
lina, the merger doctrine holds that a sublease for the entire re-
maining term is deemed to be an assignment."
The general rule is that all contracts are assignable, in the ab-
sence of an express agreement to the contrary. Where a restriction
on assignment is present, it is strictly construed as a restraint
against alienation.
With regard to subletting and assignment in particular, this
Court has long held that a lessee may freely transfer the demised
premises without the lessor's consent, absent a covenant in the
lease restricting the right of assignment. Also, the general rule is,
that covenants against subletting are strictly construed against
the lessor 2
Because these restraints are strictly construed, a prohibition in
a lease against assignment will not be construed as a prohibition
against subleasing. 3 Equally, a prohibition against subleasing is
not breached by an assignment to the new tenant, called the
assignee."
B. Percentage Rental Provisions
Many commercial leases contain percentage rental provisions.
Usually there is a base, fixed or minimum rent and an additional
rent based on a percentage of sales in excess of a fixed dollar fig-
ure. For example: minimum annual rent of $50,000.00 plus 1% of
gross annual sales in excess of $5,000,000.00. This last figure is
called the breakpoint, or the minimum level of sales that must be
achieved in order for percentage rent to be payable. The natural
breakpoint is achieved by dividing the fixed annual rent by the
specified percentage figure. The amount of percentage varies de-
pending on the type of business conducted in the premises. Gener-
ally, the tenant pays the base rental or the percentage of sales,
50. Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 647 P.2d 643, 645
(Ariz. 1982) (sublease one day shorter than assignment).
51. Neal v. Craig Brown, Inc., 86 N.C. App. 157, 162, 356 S.E.2d 912, 915, rev.
denied, 320 N.C. 794, 361 S.E.2d 80 (1987).
52. Kroger Co. v. Chemical Securities Co., 526 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tenn. 1975)
(citing cases); Accord Rowe v. Great A & P Tea Co., Inc., 385 N.E.2d 566, 570
(N.Y. 1978). Jones v. Andy Griffith Products, Inc., 35 N.C. App. 170, 241 S.E.2d
140, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 90, 244 S.E.2d 258 (1978).
53. Millinery Co. v. Little-Long Co., 197 N.C. 168, 148 S.E. 26 (1929).
54. Rogers v. Hall, 227 N.C. 363, 42 S.E.2d 347 (1947).
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whichever is greater.
North Carolina general statutes provide:
No lessor of property, merely by reason that he or she is to re-
ceive as rent or compensation for its use a share of the proceeds
or net profits of the business in which it is employed, or any other
uncertain consideration, shall be held a partner of the lease.55
Several issues arise when construing percentage rental provi-
sions. "Although percentage leases are generally governed by the
rules of law applicable to ordinary leases, the peculiar features of
provisions making rental dependent in some way upon the percent-
age of income from, or gross sales of business on the leased prem-
ises frequently present difficult questions of construction." 6 A def-
inition is needed to determine what constitutes sales: gross sales,
gross receipts, gross income or net income. Generally, the term
used is gross sales. What is included in or excluded from gross
sales also needs to be defined: sales for cash, credit, services, ware-
house stock and telephone sales. In Downtown Assoc., Ltd. v. Bur-
rows Bros. Co.,57 the court held telephone sales made from a new
location were not attributable to the subject premises.
The tenant will want to exclude items where little or no profit
is made, such as sales to employees, transfers to other stores, void
sales, refunds and accommodation sales. In Cloverland Farms
Dairy, Inc. v. Fry,58 the sale of lottery tickets was illegal when the
lease was signed. The court held that proceeds received from the
sale of state lottery tickets would not be included in gross sales.
The court also determined that the tenant's commission was to be
included in gross sales. 9 Another factor to consider is whether per-
centage sales include gross sales from a third party like a sublessee,
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. §42-1 (1991); Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N.C. 173, 74
S.E.2d 645 (1953) (lessor and lessee are not partners); State v. Keith, 126 N.C.
1114, 36 S.E.2 169 (1900). "In dealing with property subject to a lease with a
percentage rent, the' parties should be aware that one district court concluded
that a sale of a franchised restaurant property, subject to a lease calling for fixed
rent and percentage rent, was a sale of a security under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934." The court found the purchase to be an investment by the
purchaser, who was not participating in the day-to-day operations of the business.
R. LIFTON, PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE IN THE 80's at 457, (2d ed. 1983) (citing Huber-
man v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F.Supp 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972)).
56. Food Fair Stores v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166 (Md. 1964).
57. 518 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
58. 587 A.2d 527 (Md. 1991).
59. Id. at 530.
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licensee or concessioner. In Coxe v F. W. Woolworth Co.,60 the
court held that after a tenant under a percentage rental provision
discontinued use, percentage rent was also discontinued pursuant
to the lease. However, once the premises was subleased, the per-
centage rental provision did not resume. The lease was silent as to
any reactivation of the percentage rent. The court stated, "this ob-
ligation [of percentage rent] has no further conting6nt event on
which it can be reactivated; it is of no other force and effect." '6
Another consideration is the parties positions if the percentage
rental breakpoint is never reached. "It has been held that where
the percentage lease provides no minimum guarantee rental or a
purely nominal guarantee, the tenant is under an implied obliga-
tion to conduct business in good faith."62
C. Covenants Against Competition
A covenant against competition, or a restriction on use is an-
other lease provision often incorporated into commercial leases.
Such a covenant may restrict the tenant from operating certain
types of businesses in the premises and elsewhere within a defined
radius from the premises. Such a covenant may also limit the ten-
ant to a particular use within the leased premises. The terms of
such a provision may demonstrate that the parties contemplate ad-
ditional business of the tenant outside the area. 3
Contracts containing covenants against competition are in re-
straint of trade, and are strictly construed."' Covenants restricting
use are also strictly construed as restraints on alienation. 5 Cove-
nants against competition must be in writing and supported by
consideration. To be valid, a covenant against competition or use,
must be reasonable as to time, territory and terms. 7 Although
some cases have interpreted a covenant not to compete in an em-
60. 652 F. Supp. 64 (M.D. La. 1986).
61. Id. at 70.
62. Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 1280, 1284
(E.D.N.C. 1973); Accord Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775 (Cal.
1955).
63. Downtown Associates, Ltd. v. Burrows Bros. Co., 518 N.E.2d 564, 565
(Ohio St. Ct. App. 1986).
64. Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 1280, 1284
(E.D.N.C. 1973).
65. Id. at 1284.
66. James C. Greene Co. v. Kelley, 261 N.C. 166, 134 S.E.2d 166 (1964).
67. Id. at 167.
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ployment contract, the same principles have been applied to a
commercial lease containing restrictive covenants."
The courts will look to the facts of each case to determine
what is a reasonable restriction on time, territory and terms. In,
Suburban Centers, Inc. v. Big Bears Stores Co.,69 Big Bear opened
a new supermarket 1.5 miles from the leased premises and closed
the subject premises. The former store remained vacant and the
landlord for that shopping center asserted that the one mile re-
striction was unreasonable. Landlord sought to lease space in the
center free of the restriction. The court held that an exclusive use
granted to tenant, where landlord could not lease to another super-
market any part of the shopping center or other property within
one mile thereof, for use as, a supermarket, was not an unreasona-
ble restriction as to territory. 0
In Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc.,7 1 the ten-
ant, Roses, opened another store 1.9 miles from the subject prem-
ises. The lease for the subject premises contained an express cove-
nant to operate. Roses kept the old store open, but sales, and
consequently percentage rental, declined. The landlord claimed
that Roses intentionally diverted sales to the new store. The court
held that Roses did not breach its obligation of good faith by open-
ing the store. The court said to hold Roses in breach of its obliga-
tion of good faith would be to "write a restriction against competi-
tion into the lease when none existed. ' 72
D. Abandonment and Forfeiture Clauses
A forfeiture of a leasehold clause grants the landlord the right
of reentry and repossession of the premises in the event that the
tenant discontinues operation or defaults on the lease. In some
leases, the landlord must give notice of default to the tenant in
order for the tenant to have an opportunity to remedy the breach.
In other cases, the tenant must notify the landlord if the tenant
elects to discontinue business operations, placing the option on the
68. Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 1280, 1284
(E.D.N.C., 1973).
69. 1991 WL 268261 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. Dec. 12, 1991), dismissed, mot. over-
ruled, 590 N.E.2d 1267 (Ohio 1992).
70. Id.
71. 359 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
72. Id. at 1284; See also Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 30 N.C. App 84, 226
S.E.2d 232 (1976).
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landlord to terminate the lease. 73 A forfeiture clause may be
drafted to shift the burden of action in favor of the tenant or the
landlord. A lease may also incorporate a liquidated damages provi-
sion within the forfeiture clause.7 4
A lease may also contain a clause describing abandonment of
the premises and the landlord's rights on abandonment. Abandon-
ment does not occur until the tenant, "with the intent to abandon,
does something, or fails to do something, that results in an abso-
lute relinquishment of the premises. ' 75 Even if a tenant ceases
business in a center, continuing to pay base rent or exercising con-
trol over the premises to forestall competition,. such actions would
not constitute abandonment.76
E. Continuous Occupancy
A lease may expressly require the tenant to use or occupy a
minimum amount of space in the premises. In CBL & Assoc., Inc.
v. McCrory Corp.,77 CBL was the landlord of a mall in Georgia in
which McCrory, the tenant, operated a 9,306 square foot store,
under a twenty year lease with a percentage rental provision. After
operating for ten years and losing over $50,000 during the last two
years of the lease period, McCrory sought to close it's store. The
lease contained the following express covenant to continuously op-
erate: "Tenant agrees to ... operate one hundred percent (100%)
of the lease premises during the entire term . . . with due diligence
and efficiency so as to produce all of the Gross Sales (sic) which
may, be produced by such manner of operation. "78
CBL sought a mandatory injunction to force McCrory to keep
its store open. The court refused to grant an injunction on the
grounds that landlord's loss was purely economic, that landlord
had an adequate remedy at law, and the court would not exercise
its discretionary equitable power where specialized knowledge, skill
and judgment would be required to implement its orders over a
73. Coxe v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 652 F. Supp. 64, 69 (M.D. La. 1986); See
also Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Texas Co., 383 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App.
1964).
74. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 777 (Cal. 1955).
75. Century Shopping Center Fund I v. Crivello, 456 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Wis.
1990), (petition for rev. denied).
76. Id.; Compare Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259 (S.C.
1989), (cert. denied).
77. 761 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
78. Id. at 808.
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long period..79
F. Options to Renew
Options to renew or extend lease terms are found in most
commercial leases. Absent an express provision to renew, there is
no implied right to renew the lease.80 "A covenant which in general
terms provides a right of renewals will be construed as granting
only one renewal."'" Covenants for perpetual renewal are not fa-
vored by law.82 In North Carolina, the brightline rule is that a per-
petual right of renewal must contain words of perpetuity like, "for-
ever," "for all times," or "in perpetuity." 3 Language that the lease
is to be "automatically renewed or successively renewed" does not
satisfy the rule.84 Some states have held that the word "successive"
implies a perpetuity. 5
To be effective, an option to renew must be supported by con-
sideration. If the lease renewal is triggered by notice to the land-
lord, it is a condition precedent to renewal. A tenant who holds
over the original term without notifying the landlord of his intent
to renew, is deemed to have a month-to-month tenancy.86 If there
is a renewal provision that does not require the lessee to give no-
tice to the landlord of his intent to renew, and the landlord accepts
tenant's rent, the tenant is deemed to have exercised a renewal.8 7 A
79. CBL & Assoc., Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 761 F. Supp. 807, 808-809 (M.D.
Ga. 1991); Accord Grossman v. Wegman's Food Markets. Inc., 43 A.D.2d 813, 350
N.Y.S.2d 484 (1973); New Park Forest Assoc. II v. Rogers Enterprises, Inc., 552
N.E.2d 1215, cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990); Bradlees Tidewater
Inc. v Walnut Hill Investment Inc., 391 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 1990). Contra Dover
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons Inc., 164 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super. 1960)
(landlord waived continued judicial supervision); Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Ricther's
Jewelry Co., Inc., 12 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1943) (rental based solely on percentage of
tenant sales).
80. Barnes v. Saleeby, 177 N.C. 256, 98 S.E. 708 (1919).
81. Lattimore v. Fisher's Food Shoppe, Inc., 313 N.C. 467, 471, 329 S.E.2d
346, 348 (1985).
82. Id. at 470, 329 S.E.2d at 348.
83. WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 277, (citing Lattimore v.
Fisher's Food Shoppe, Inc., 313 N.C. 467, 471, 329 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1985)).
84. Lattimore, 313 N.C. at 470, 329 S.E.2d at 348.
85. Pechenik v. B&O R.R. Co., 205 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1974). Gleason v.
Tompkins, 84 Misc.2d 174, 375 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1975), McLean v. United States,
316 F.Supp. 827 (E.D. Va. 1970).
86. Rushing Constr. Co. v. MCM Ventures II, Inc., 100 N.C. App. 259, 395
S.E.2d 330 (1990).
87. WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 292, citing Kearney v.
288 [Vol. 14:275
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss3/1
COMMERCIAL LEASES
lease may provide that if a landlord has not received notice of ten-
ant's intent to exercise an option, that option will continue until
landlord has advised tenant of non-receipt of notice. Tenant's op-
tion right will continue until notice is given or passage of the pe-
riod of time set forth in the lease.
A sublessee may not exercise an option to renew that was
granted in the original lease. There is no privity of contract or es-
tate between the original lessor and the sublessee. 8
VI. IMPLIED COVENANTS
In addition to the express provisions agreed to by the parties,
"there exists in every contract certain implied-by-law covenants,
such as the promise to act in good faith in the course of
performance. '"89
Courts will seek the true intention of parties as inferred from
the whole lease agreement. A court "will view the agreement from
the time it was made." 90 This intent may also be gleaned from
lease negotiations. Where the lease is silent or contains an ambigu-
ity, it may "be necessary at trial to receive extrinsic proof as to the
history of the relationship between the parties, their reasonable ex-
pectations, and all other factors bearing upon their intention in en-
tering into the lease."91 It may be stated generally that:
implied covenants are not favored in the law; and courts will de-
clare the same to exist only when there is a satisfactory basis in
the express contract of the parties which makes it necessary to
imply certain duties and obligations in order to effect the pur-
poses of the parties to the contract made.92
The Supreme Court of California set forth five prerequisites
Hare, 265 N.C. 270, 144 S.E.2d 636 (1965).
88. Neal v. Craig Brown, Inc., 86 N.C. App. 157, 162, 356 S.E.2d 912, 915, rev.
denied, 320 N.C. 794, 361 S.E.2d 80 (1987).
89. Rowe v. Great A & P Tea Co., Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 385 N.E.2d 566, 569,
412 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (1978); Accord Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386
S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1989), cert denied, (1990); Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's
Stores, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
90. Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Texas Co., 383 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. Ct.
App. 1964).
91. Fifth Ave. Shopping Center, Inc. v. Grand Union Co., 491 F. Supp 77, 81
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (hearing on motion to amend and for summary judgment); Ac-
cord Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1989), cert denied,
(1990).
92. Kroger Co. v. Chemical Securities Co., 526 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tenn. 1975).
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which determine whether implied covenants exist:
(1) The implication must arise from the language used or it must
be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties; (2) it
must appear from the language used that it was so clearly within
the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary
to express it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on the
grounds of legal necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only
where it can be rightfully assumed that it would have been made
if attention had been called to it; (5) there can be no implied cov-
enant where the subject matter is completely covered by the
contract."
In Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., the Ari-
zona court stated that "[iut is not enough to say that it is necessary
to make the contract fair, that it ought to have contained a stipula-
tion which is not found in it, or that without such covenant it
would be improvident, unwise or operate unjustly."94
The Tennessee Supreme Court stated in Kroger Co. v. Chemi-
cal Securities Co., that the reason for these rules is "[t]he courts
have no rightful authority to make contracts for litigants."'9 5 "Ab-
sent illegality, contracting parties are free to bargain as they see
fit. When the bargained-for agreement is reduced to writing, a
court may not make a new contract for the parties .or rewrite the
existing contract."96
A. Factors that Mitigate Against the Presence of Implied Cove-
nants to Operate
Generally, equity will not compel an affirmative act by a party
where other means of redress are available to the aggrieved party.
An owner of real property is not required to make any affirmative
use of his property. Legal possession has never required actual use
or occupancy. In jurisdictions where a lease is regarded primarily
as a conveyance of real property, as opposed to a contract, courts
93. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1955). (quoted in
Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 647 P.2d 643 (Ariz. 1982)).
94. Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 647 P.2d 643 (Ariz. 1982)
(citations omitted).
95. Kroger Co. v. Chemical Securities Co., 526 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tenn. 1975)
(citations omitted).
96. Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 530 (Okla. 1985);
Accord Keystone Square Shopping Center Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 459
N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
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will interpret use and occupancy clauses merely as a restriction on
use, and not a compulsion to use.
7
In Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc.,98 a U.S. dis-
trict court, applying North Carolina law under the Erie99 doctrine,
interpreted an express use and continuous operations clause. The
lease provided:
The Tenant shall use and occupy the entire buildings on the de-
mised premises for sales by Tenant at retail of merchandise and
for no other purpose.
Tenant shall diligently and continuously operate and conduct its
retail business throughout the entire term and shall use all proper
and reasonable efforts consistent with good business practice to
the end that the gross sales of such business shall throughout the
entire lease term be as large as possible. 00
The court found that "[tihe language of the lease provides
that the [tenant] has an obligation to diligently and continuously
operate its business in [the premises] and to use all proper and
reasonable efforts to make gross sales as large as possible." ' Ten-
ant had paid substantial percentage rental in the past. While keep-
ing the subject store operating, tenant also opened a new store 1.9
miles away. The court refused to imply any further duty or restric-
tion on the tenant. "It is the conclusion of this court that the [ten-
ant] has breached no obligation imposed by the lease."10 2
In jurisdictions that apply rules of contract construction to
leases, landlords generally have not been successful in securing the
presence of implied covenants to continuously occupy or operate.
One reason for the court's reluctance to imply any covenant is the
presumption that agreements reduced to writing represent all of
97. See Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 and 25c Stores, Inc., 213 N.C. 606, 609, 197
S.E. 174, 176 (1938); Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 138-141,
225 S.E.2d 797, 810-12 (1976); Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 30 N.C. App 84, 86-
87, 226 S.E.2d 232, 234 (1976).
98. Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 1280
(E.D.N.C. 1973).
99. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
100. Kauder, 359 F.Supp. at 1280.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1284. But see United Dominion Realty v. Wal-Mart Stores, 413
S.E.2d 866, (S.C. Ct. App. 1992). In this case, the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals analyzed similar language contained in the leasp and held that the tenant,
Wal-Mart, breached its lease by failing to operate a discount store on the leased
property. The court used a contract analysis to reach their conclusion.
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the parties' understandings. 10  Therefore, the exclusion of any ex-
press obligation on the tenant to operate or occupy in the lease is
substantial evidence that no duty to conduct business was in-
tended. "The parties did not agree to nor bargain for [tenant's]
continuous occupation of the premises, and we are not authorized
to rewrite the contract to create such a provision.' 10 Where parol
evidence has been admitted showing that lease negotiations ex-
cluded an express covenant to operate, courts have refused to im-
ply an operation covenant. 10 5
If a lease contains substantial or reasonable fixed rental, most
courts have also refused to imply an obligation on the tenant to
operate.' 60 The main duty of a tenant is to pay rent. 0 7 Most courts
regard the fixed rental as the primary consideration for the lease
and view percentage rental as an expectation or "bonus."'0 8 This is
particularly true where percentage rent was possible, but never
paid.10 9.Most leases with percentage rent clauses also contain pro-
visions that expressly disclaim any representations of sales volume
that may be derived from the premises. 10
Another express lease provision that negates an implied duty
103. The court allowed landlord's claim for ejectment, and forfeited tenant's
leasehold. Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079 (Idaho 1982); Mercury Inv.
Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985); People's Drug Stores, Inc.
v. Mayfair, N.V., 50 N.C. App. 442, 274 S.E.2d 365 (1981).
104. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d 478, 480 (Ga. 1991)
(citations omitted).
105. Warren Plaza Co. v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 1990 WL 82537 (Ohio App. June
15, 1990); Kroger Co. v. Chem. Sec. Co., 526 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tenn. 1975).
106. Carl A. Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982); Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 647 P.2d 643 (Ariz. 1982);
Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976); Kroger
Co. v. Chem. Sec. Co., 526 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. 1975); Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 and
25c Stores, Inc., 213 N.C. 606, 197 S.E. 174 (1938); Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc.,
643 P.2d 1079 (Idaho 1982); Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Eastgate Assoc. Ltd.,
392 S.E.2d 337 (Ga. App. 1990); Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706
P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985).
107. Id. at 2.
108. Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 30 N.C. App 84, 87, 226 S.E.2d 232, 234
(1976).
109. Lorch, Inc. v. Bessemer Hall Shopping Center, Inc., 310 So.2d 872 (Ala.
1975); Grossman v. Wegman's Food Markets, Inc., 43 A.D.2d 813 (N.Y. 1973);
CBL & Assoc., Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 761 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Carl A.
Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger C%4, 317 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. App. 1982).
110. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Eastgate Assoc. Ltd., 392 S.E.2d 337
(Ga. App. 1990).
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to operate is tenant's right to assign or sublease. In Cascade Drive
Ltd. Partnership v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,'" the Fifth Circuit
stated: "[w]e agree with the district court that the express broad
sublet provision in this lease is inconsistent with an implied obliga-
tion of continuous operation .... ."I" However, the Arizona Court
of Appeals has held that "[t]he presence of a right to assign or
sublet is not necessarily inconsistent with an implied covenant of
continuous operation. The two covenants can be harmonized to
permit subletting or assignment to a business of the same
character." '13
The presence of an express use or operating covenants in
leases of other tenants in same center where the subject lease is
silent has been held to negate the assertion that an implied duty to
operate exists. In Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp,"4 "[t]hey limited cer-
tain tenants to particular sales area and not others; they required
covenants against vacancy and abandonment of certain tenants
and not of others. The leases were executed around the same time;
it is therefor perfectly obvious that the landlord, in its individual
dealings with separate tenants, tailored the leases according to the
exigencies of the situation." ' 5 "Plaintiff negotiated several con-
tracts during that period with other tenants in the shopping
center. Some of those contracts specifically included continuous oc-
cupancy clauses. Under these circumstances, we find the parties'
intent did not encompass Kroger's being bound by a continuous
occupancy clause."" 6
111. 934 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1991).
112. Id. at 62; Accord Chicago Title & Trust Co v. Southland Corp., 443
N.E.2d 294 (Ill. Appt. Ct. 1982); Bradlees Tidewater, Inc. v. Walnut Hill Inv.,
Inc., 391 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 1990); Coxe v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 652 F. Supp. 64
(M.D. La. 1986); Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Eastgate Assoc. Ltd., 392 S.E.2d
337 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 647 P.2d
643 (Ariz. 1982); Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d
797 (1976); Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 30 N.C. App 84, 226 S.E.2d 232 (1976);
Chicago Title & Trust Co v. Southland Corp., 443 N.E.2d 294 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982);
Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079 (Idaho 1982).
113. First Amer. Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d 938, 941,
rev. denied (Ariz. 1986); Accord Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d
259 (S.C. 1989), cert denied, (1990).
114. 216 S.E.2d 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
115. Id. at 344; accord Carl A. Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
116. Carl A. Schuberg, Inc., 317 N.W.2d at 610; Accord Lorch, Inc. v. Besse-
mer Hall Shopping Center, Inc., 310 So.2d 872, 874 (Ala. 1975).
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The courts have also reviewed other leases of the subject ten-
ant to determine whether an express provision to operate is pre-
sent or if the tenant had a policy regarding such clauses. "The rec-
ord reveals that [the tenant] . . . had a specific policy of not
binding itself to continual occupancy clauses." '1 7 Evidence of lease
negotiations were admitted at trial that showed that the tenant
had never put restrictions in its leases whereby it would guarantee
to operate any particular facility.
In GMS Management Co., Inc. v. Pick-N-Pay Supermarket,
Inc,"" the landlord asserted that the use clause contained in ten-
ant's lease implied a duty to continuously operate. Tenant asserted
that the use provision was restrictive rather than mandatory and,
"... submitted and incorporated copies of leases of various other
tenants in the shopping center. These leases contained specific
clauses, in addition to the 'use' clauses, which provided that the
tenants were required to continuously use the premises for the
stated purpose throughout the entire lease term." 1 9 The court af-
firmed the trial court's holding that "[c]lauses similar to this one
have been construed in many cases, and it has never been held to
be an agreement to occupy and use the demised premises, but only
to restrict the purpose for which the premises may be used. '1 20
If a lease expressly grants tenant the right to remove fixtures
or equipment, courts have held that no implied covenant to oper-
ate was intended. "[I]n the face of express provisions in the con-
tract, allowing lessee to . . . remove fixtures from the premises,
such a covenant could not be implied.' 121
In many cases, a landlord is asserting a duty on a shopping
center tenant to operate under the theory of economic interdepen-
dence, and the harm to the remaining tenants that would result in
the center if the tenant ceased operations. Where a lease pertains
to a free-standing building, this factor is not at issue. In Stevens v.
Mobile Oil Corp., ss the landlord of a gas station whose lease con-
tained a percentage rent clause claimed the lease obligated the ten-
ant to continue to operate a service station. The court held that
117. Carl A. Schuberg, Inc., 317 N.W.2d at 610; Accord Kroger Co. v. Chemi-
cal Sec. Co., 526 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Tenn. 1975).
118. 601 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
119. Id. at 74.
120. Id. at 75, citing Weil v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 281 S.W.2d 651, 654
(Tex. Ct. App. 1955).
121. Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 912, 643 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Idaho 1982).
122. 412 F.Supp. 809 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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the economic interdependence theory did not apply.
The intent and good faith of tenant in closing or moving its
business is another factor courts have used to negate the presence
of an implied covenant to continuously operate. "[T]he lease . . .
prohibits the lessee from unreasonably diverting business to an-
other location merely to reduce liability for rent .... We find no
evidence indicating that the diversion of business from the prem-
ises was unconscionable or made in bad faith. 111 3 The court re-
fused to imply a duty on the tenant inconsistent with the express
provisions of the lease."2 4 "There is no suggestion that [tenant]
stopped using the space in any bad faith to reduce sales
volume .. ."12
A factor supporting a claim of good faith in closing or moving
a business is a tenant's profitability. In Parrish v. Robertson,"2 6 a
three-year restaurant lease provided for a base rental plus 10% of
the net .profits. After eighteen months the tenant closed and moved
to another location. The landlord sought the percentage in addi-
tion to the base rental. The court rejected this contention stating
that "it can hardly be contended that the [tenant] would have
been obligated to continue... if they were losing money. Acting in
good faith . . . they could close the business thus limiting their
obligation under the contract.to the payment of base rental. .. ."
Another factor to consider in finding good faith is whether
substantial expenditures may be required to improve the premises
to meet current building or zoning codes. In Stevens v. Mobile
Oil,12 7 the court refused to imply a duty to operate a service station
where that use was non-conforming and where major renovation
and expense would be involved.
An analogous fact situation occurred in Powell v. Socony Mo-
bile Oil Co.1 28 The landlord asserted that a covenant for tenant to
comply with all laws and regulations required tenant to continu-
ously operate in order to protect a non-conforming use. The court
held otherwise.
If another tenant has re-occupied the premises after the sub-
123. Downtown Assoc., Ltd. v. Burrows Bros. Co., 518 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1986).
124. Accord Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 1280
(E.D.N.C. 1973).
125. In re Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 766 F.2d 1136, 1140 (7th Cir. 1985).
126. 80 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Va. 1954).
127. 412 F.Supp. 809 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
128. 179 N.E.2d 82 (Ohio Ct. Apps. 1960).
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ject tenant has closed, courts have held that this is some evidence
of good faith and mitigation of damages by the subject tenant
which negates an implied duty to continuously operate.1 29
The lease may contain a forfeiture or landlord's reentry clause
if tenant has closed. As noted earlier, such clauses are strictly con-
strued. 1 In Kroger Co. v. Chemical Securities Co.,' the lease
provided that "if the tenant voluntarily vacates the premises and
[it] remains vacant for one year, the landlord has the right to can-
cel the lease and re-enter the premises."' 32 Tenant closed and sub-
let the premises to another tenant with a different use. Landlord
sought to imply a covenant against subletting. The court held that
the lease contained neither an implied covenant of continuous oc-
cupancy nor an implied covenant against subletting.
B. Factors and Express Lease Provisions that Mitigate Toward
the Finding of an Implied Covenant to Continuously Operate
Where an ambiguity in a lease arises, or where a situation is
not addressed in the lease, courts will add covenants that are im-
plied-by-law before construing the lease. The presence or absence
of certain express provisions represent the intent of the parties
which guide the court's conclusion on whether covenants to use or
operate were intended.
The courts will first determine the identity of the party who
prepared the agreement and construe the lease against the party
that drafted the document. 3 ' Further, if a standard, printed form
was used, or if a party refused to negotiate, courts have held that
implied covenants exist.'
Most shopping center tenants seek exclusive rights to sell
specified products or services in the center or within a defined ra-
dius from the premises. 35 In exchange for these rights, a landlord
129. Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 647 P.2d 643 (Ariz.
1982); Cascade Drive Ltd. Partnership v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 61 (5th
Cir. 199i).
130. Davis v. Wickline, 135 S.E.2d 812 (Va. 1964).
131. 526 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. 1975).
132. Id. at 470.
133. Id. at 470.
134. Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc.; 386 S.E.2d 259, 262 (S.C. 1989);
Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 781 (Cal. 1955). But see Carl A.
Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606, 607 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (lease
not construed against drafter).
135. Slidell Investment Co., Inc. v. City Prod. Corp., 202 So.2d 323, 325 (La.
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will seek to limit tenant's use of the premises to those specified
exclusive uses in tenant's lease. Many landlords will also attempt
to restrict a tenant from selling certain products or services if land-
lord has given or may give an exclusive use for those products and
services to another tenant. To harmonize the leases of various te-
nants and to satisfy a dominant tenant's demand for-exclusive
rights, a landlord may require the presence of express restrictions
in co-tenants' leases of uses specifically allowed in the dominant
tenant's lease.
Landlords may further seek to commit tenant to continuously
use and occupy the premises for the conduct of business specified
in the lease. As stated earlier, the majority rule is that a lease pro-
vision that requires tenant to use and occupy the premises for a
particular business is construed as a limitation on use. The tenant
is not compelled to occupy the premises for any purpose whatso-
ever. This view is consistent with interpreting the lease as a con-
veyance of an estate. One commentator has said that a comprehen-
sive express use clause should contain certain elements to be valid:
The tenant shall conduct its business in the demised premises
continuously on all days and hours during which the shopping
center is open.
The tenant shall keep its store continuously and fully stocked
with top quality merchandise.
The tenant shall keep its store fully staffed with employees.
The tenant shall operate its store as a typical operation of its
kind as presently conducted in the vicinity in which the demised
premises are located (the landlord will permit no similar opera-
tion in the shopping center).
The tenant shall use its best efforts to achieve a maximum sales
volume in the demised premises.
The tenant shall conduct its business under the name designated
as the tenants business name.
The tenant shall utilize at least - percent of the floor area
of the demised premises for retail sales activities.1 3
Although this list is not comprehensive, it provides the land-
lord with guidelines in drafting express continuous operation and
use covenants.
In the landmark case of Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 and 25c
Ct. App. 1967). See also Century Shopping Center Fund I v. Crivello, 456 N.W.2d
858, petition for review denied (Wis. 1990).
136. David F. Fishman, What counsel must know about Continuous Use
Covenants, THE PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER, March 1987, at 36.
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Stores, Inc.,'37 Roses paid base and percentage rental for three
years. During the last year, Roses did not operate a business in the
store and paid only the base rental. The landlord admitted "there
is no express covenant in the lease that the store will be operated,"
but contends that such covenant is "implied in the very terms of
the contract and the nature of the lease." 138 The court held:
Apart from the question of liability for waste, it seems that the
tenant is under no obligation, in the absence of specific provisions
therefor, to occupy or use, or continue to use, the leased premises,
even though one of the parties, or both, expected and intended
that they would be used for the particular purpose to which they
seemed to be adapted or constructed."3 9
However, other courts have held that the presence of a per-
centage rental clause in a lease is evidence of the parties' intent
that the tenant would operate a business in the premises. 140 In ad-
dition to presence of percentage rental, courts have looked to the
adequacy of the base rental and the payment history of percentage
rent and have implied a covenant to continuously operate. 4"
Some leases contain a lowered threshold at which percentage
rent becomes payable. This provision is known as an "unnatural
breakpoint," and can show that the parties placed a higher impor-
tance on the payment of percentage rental as a part of the total
137. 213 N.C. 606, 197 S.E. 174 (1938).
138. Id. at 609, 197 S.E. at 175.
139. Accord GMS Management Co., Inc. v. Pick-N-Pay Supermarkets, Inc.,
"Where a lease provides for rental based on a percentage of sales with a fixed
substantial adequate minimum, and there is no express covenant or agreement to
occupy and use the premises, no implied covenant or agreement will be inferred
that the lessee is bound to occupy and use the premises for the purpose expressed
in the lease. Under such a lease, lessee has no obligation to occupy and use the
premises for any stated definite period of time and his obligation under such a
lease is limited to the payment of the basic minimum rental to the end of the
term when he no longer occupies and uses the premises for purpose expressed in
the lease." Id., citing Kretch v. Stark, (C.P. 1962), 26 O.02d 385.
140. Jerrico, Inc. v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 400 So.2d 1316, 1318 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Slidell Investment Co., Inc. v. City Prod. Corp., 202 So.2d
323, 325 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
141. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 780 (Cal. 1955); Lincoln
Tower Corp. v. Ricther's Jewelry Co., Inc., 12 So.2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1943); First
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d 938, 940, rev. de-
nied, (Ariz. 1986); Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons Inc., 164 A.2d
785, 791 (N.J. Super 1960).
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rental. 42 Obviously, there are no sales from a vacant or closed
building. Where the fixed rental is purely nominal, or not substan-
tial, courts have implied a duty on the tenant to operate a business
in good faith.143
The position, store size, customer base and length of commit-
ment that a tenant makes to the shopping center has led many
courts to the conclusion that a center's economic existence is de-
pendent upon this tenant. A tenant in this position has been re-
ferred to as an "anchor," "major" or "magnet" tenant."' Gener-
ally, an anchor tenant occupies a major portion of the total space
in the shopping center. 45 Usually, the premises was built to suit
the specific needs of the tenant in accordance with plans provided
by the tenant. In most cases, the tenant exercises veto power over
the location of its store in the shopping center, the parking area
and other provisions of the site plan and layout." "[T]he primary
function of an anchor is to draw customers into the center. This, in
turn, attracts satellite tenants, increases their business and enables
the landlord to charge higher rents, resulting in an overall en-
hancement of the value of the shopping center." 47
Other indications of the importance of a particular tenant are
the length of the lease term and the landlord's use of the anchor's
lease to obtain financing for the shopping center. 148 If the tenant is
considered to be an "anchor tenant," the courts have been more
likely to find an implied duty to operate.
The relative importance of a particular tenant can be shown
by co-tenant leases containing rights against the landlord due to
actions by the anchor tenant.4 9 For example, a co-tenant may have
142. Lippman, 280 P.2d at 780.
143. Fifth Ave. Shopping Center, Inc. v. Grand Union Co., 491 F. Supp 77, 81
(N.D. Ga. 1980); Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 780 (Cal. 1955);
Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Ricther's Jewelry Co., Inc., 12 So.2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1943);
Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 1280, 1283 (E.D.N.C.
1973).
144. Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 260 (1989);
Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 772 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Nev. 1989).
145. Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 260 (S.C. 1989),
cert denied, (1990).
146. Id.
147. Marquis, Albert G. Implied Covenants of Continuous Occupancy in
Shopping Centers, JOURNAL OF PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, July/August 1990, pg 60-
61.
148. Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 772 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Nev. 1989).
149. Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 260 (S.C. 1989),
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the right to reduce rental, close its business or even be able to can-
cel its lease based upon the absence of the anchor tenant.15 These
factors can support landlord's assertion that a particular tenant is
an anchor tenant and as such, the anchor has the implied duty to
continuously operate.
Every lease contains an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Some courts have found bad faith from a tenant clos-
ing its business and re-opening in nearby location. Landlords often
allege that the tenant is intentionally keeping the former premises
vacant or is using the premises only for storage in order to divert
sales to the new location. 51 The tenant's breach of the implied
covenant of good faith has led the court to find an implied duty to
operate, which was also breached when the tenant closed the prem-
ises and reopened nearby. 1 2
The general rule excludes from evidence all prior and contem-
poraneous negotiations between the parties to explain, vary or add
to the written agreement. However, courts have allowed evidence
of negotiations that occurred during an assignment of an existing
lease as evidence of the intention of the parties. 53 Also, where
terms in the lease are not defined or have "no fixed legal signifi-
cance," courts have allowed evidence of the parties' negotiations to
explain the meaning of those terms. 5 '
The presence of an express provision in the lease that allows
for a mandatory injunction or other compulsive equitable relief in
the event of a breach is another factor that leads a court to imply a
covenant to continuously operate. In Dover Shopping Center, Inc.
v. Cushman's Sons Inc.,1 55 the court granted specific performance
requiring the tenant to continuously operate where the landlord
waived continued judicial supervision and would rely on defend-
cert denied, (1990).
150. Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Texas Co., 383 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. Civ.
Ct. App. 1964).
151. Century Shopping Center Fund I v. Crivello, 456 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Wis.
1990), petition for review denied; Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 772
P.2d 1284, 1284 (Nev. 1989); Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Texas Co., 383 S.W.2d
193, 194 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1964).
152. Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 262 (S.C. 1989),
cert denied, (1990).
153. Ingannamorte v. Kings Super Markets, Inc., 260 A.2d 841, 842 (N.J.
1970).
154. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 780 (Cal. 1955) ("mini-
mum monthly payment").
155. 164 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super 1960).
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ant's good faith in operating in the future. The lease provided, "In
the event of a breach or threatened breach by the tenant of any of
the covenants or provisions hereof, Landlord shall have the right of
"1156injunction ....
A shopping center can be defined as a combination of interre-
lated retail activities at one location. The interrelationship of the
tenants has permitted some courts to find the presence of a duty to
operate based on a theory of economic interdependence. In Ingan-
namorte v. Kings Super Markets, Inc.,'15 the court distinguished
non-shopping center cases by stating "but these cases .. .did not
involve a situation where, as here, there are interdependent eco-
nomic units and the landlord had an obvious interest in the contin-
ued active operation of the leased premises far beyond the limited
payment of the fixed monthly rental. ' 158 In South Carolina, the
court of appeals stated that "[tiwo other tenants entered into lease
agreements for space in the center which made specific provisions
regarding the operation of [the anchor tenant], in the center. ' 159
The court held that:
[i]t is clear from the record that a major reason [tenant] entered
into the lease was the ability of ... the anchor tenant, to draw
customers to the shopping center as a whole. The use of one or
more anchor tenants to bring customers to the smaller shops in a
shopping center is a common practice. If the anchor were permit-
ted to leave the premises vacant, the landlord's purpose for sign-
ing the lease would be defeated."' 0
The reason for the economic interdependence theory was
stated succinctly in 1943 by the Florida Supreme Court which up-
held specific enforcement of an express covenant to continuously
operate which was contained in the lease of a jewelry store tenant:
Another purpose in enforcing the covenant was to assure to all of
the tenants the advantage of continued business activity because
a client or customer of any place of business in the locality was a
potential client or customer, at least, of all the others... The
interest of the landlord and its tenants were in this situation in-
156. Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons Inc., 164 A.2d 785, 790
(N.J. Super 1960).
157. Ingannamorte v. Kings Super Markets, Inc., 260 A.2d 841 (N.J. 1970).
158. Id. at 843.
159. Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 260 (S.C. 1989),
cert denied, (1990).
160. Id. at 262.
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* extricably bound together.' 61
Recently the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial
court's dismissal of a complaint seeking an injunction to require
tenant to use and occupy the premises. The Court found that the
lease did not expressly obligate the tenant to occupy and use the
premises. -owever, the court held that the landlord's complaint
stated a claim in spite of the precedent in favor of tenant because
the factual situations in those cases were different than "the spe-
cific situation presented here, i.e., a completely vacant store front
on an interdependent shopping mall where the lease itself contains
provisions other than the use clause from which an obligation to
use and occupy might be implied. ' 162
VII. REMEDIES AND RELIEF
Many alternative solutions are available for breach of a lease.
Parties cannot contract for every type of breach imaginable. Reme-
dies at law have often been favored, but equitable remedies are
gaining acceptance. in the courts.
A. Remedies at Law
A request for damages is the most common type of relief
sought when a lease is breached. Damages are controlled by the
principles of contract law. 163 Compensatory damages for rent owed
may be recovered as well as consequential damages. The cause and
amount of loss must be shown with reasonable certainty. If dam-
ages are conjectural, remote or speculative, they are not recover-
able. 6 "Damages for breach of a contract may include loss of pro-
161. Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Ricther's Jewelry Co., Inc., 12 So.2d 452, 453
(Fla. 1943).
162. Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 546 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. Super. 1988).
But see Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 647 P.2d 643 (Ariz. 1982);
Grossman v. Wegman's Food Markets. Inc., 43 A.2d 813 (N.Y. 1973); Mercury.
Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985); CBL & Assoc., Inc. v.
McCrory Corp., 761 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1991); New Park Forest Assoc. II v.
Rogers Enterprises, Inc., 552 N.E.2d 1215, cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990); Surburban Centers, Inc. v. Big Bears Stores Co., 1991 WL 268261 (Ohio
App. 10 Dist. Dec. 12, 1991) (where the court recognized the importance of an
anchor tenant but denied an implied covenant of continuous operation or equita-
ble relief).
163. WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at § 297.
164. Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd., 97 N.C. App. 511, 522,
389 S.E.2d 576, 582 (1990) (Mosley II). Accord Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N.C. 173,
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spective profits . . '"' They may also include consequential
damages such as diminution of value of the shopping center due to
the breach.6
The Nevada Supreme Court realized the importance of an
anchor when it awarded 1 million dollars for diminution in value of
the shopping center in Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1.167
The court relied on the anchor-tenant theory in awarding damages
to the landlord when the tenant, a supermarket, closed. 6 8 One au-
thor described the loss of an anchor tenant as worse than a flood,
fire or tornado, because usually there is insurance to cover such
disasters.' An anchor's primary functions are to provide certainty
of income stream, an identity and stability for the center which, in
turn, draws customers, attracts other tenants and increases overall
sales. When the anchor vacates, much of this is lost.
A landlord may also be entitled to other damages.
For example, in addition to the devaluation which takes place the
moment the anchor leaves, there may be expenses relative to the
hardship reaped on the other tenants. Because the gross sales of
satellite tenants will decline, it will become difficult for many of
them to pay rent. Some will vacate, and others will have to be
evicted. This may result in uncollected rents, greater vacancies,
eviction expenses, and leasing commissions. 170
The majority rule holds that punitive damages are not recov-
erable in a breach of a contract. A tort, like fraud, must be proven
in addition to a breach of contract for an award of punitive dam-
ages.'7' In Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores' 7 the "plaintiff
charge[d] that by [an] intentional understatement of the gross
sales, defendant reduced the rent to which plaintiff was entitled
74 S.E.2d 645 (1953).
165. Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd., 97 N.C. App. 511, 523,
389.S.E.2d 576, 583 (1990) (Mosley II).
166. Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 12, 772 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Nev.
1989).
167. 772 P.2d 1284 (Nev. 1989).
168. Id. at 1286.
169. Albert G. Marquis, Implied Covenants of Continuous Occupancy in
Shopping Centers, JOURNAL OF PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, July/August 1990 at 60.
170. Id. at 64.
171. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797
(1976).
172. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
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under contract. Certainly. . .[this] smacks of tort. ' 17 3 The court al-
lowed plaintiffs claim for punitive damages.
Measuring the damages is often difficult. Damages must be
foreseeable and ascertainable with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty. 174 There also must be a reasonable basis for computation.
"Damages are not rendered uncertain so as to prevent their recov-
ery because they cannot be calculated with exactness. It is enough
that the results be only approximate. 1' 75 In Hornwood,l7 1 testi-
mony was admitted to show the value of the shopping center de-
creased by 1 million dollars after the anchor tenant left. The court
of appeals reversed the trial court's decision that the closing and
withdrawal of the anchor tenant was unforeseeable and not
compensable.
The rule in Washington Trust Bank v. Circle K Corp.1 77 is
often cited to measure damages when the tenant breaches a lease.
"The measure of damages is the difference between the present
worth of the property with the lease less the present worth of the
property without the lease. 17 8 North Carolina follows this rule.
1 79
The Georgia Court of Appeals followed this rule when it held that
"[t]he proper measure of damages is the excess rent reserved under
the lease, over the reasonable rental value of the premises at the
time of the breach." 180
The Idaho Court of Appeals also upheld this method in deter-
mining damages when they found an implied covenant to pay rea-
sonable rent for the full term of the lease.
18 1
To determine the fair rental value the trial court considered sev-
eral factors - the value'of the property from the perspective of a
hypothetical new lessee, the past rental history of the property,
the circumstances of the parties on leasing and a fair return on
the lessor's investment in the property. 82
173. Id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 808.
174. Jerrico, Inc. v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 400 So.2d 1316, 1318 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
175. Id.
176. 772 P.2d 1284 (Nev. 1989).
177. 546 P.2d 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
178. Id. at 1252.
179. Kearns v. Gay, 232 F.Supp 475, 479 (1964).
180. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Eastgate Assoc. Ltd., 392 S.E.2d 337,
339 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
181. Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Idaho 1982).
182. Id.
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In Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,' 3 the court cited the
above-stated rule for damages but employed an agreement of the
parties from the terms of the lease. The parties made specific pro-
visions for the payment of damages if the tenant ceased to occupy.
The tenant did not cease to occupy the premises, it only ceased
business operations. The lease also provided for a payment to the
landlord upon subleasing: "the average monthly rental paid by the
tenant to the landlord during the twelve month period last pro-
ceeding such subletting or assignment. '"1 84 The court employed this
method to determine rent owed upon discontinuance of business
operations.
In Kauder, Klotz & Vennitt v. Rose's Stores, Inc.,'15 the land-
lord requested that damages be determined by imputing sales from
a new location to landlord's premises when the tenant opened a
new store 1.9 miles away. The lease contained a provision for per-
centage rent. The landlord claimed that sales were diverted to the
new store, diminishing his income. The court denied landlord this
measure of damages. Under similar facts, the court denied this
type of damage award in Lowe's of Shelby, Inc.'8 6
Other damages recoverable on breach of a lease include "past
due rents, taxes, special damages, repairs and restoration of prem-
ises to its former condition . . . . 87
Another remedy at law is an action in abandonment. A land-
lord often claims that the tenant abandons the leased property
when he discontinues business on the premises. A tenant must do
something or fail to do something that results in absolute relin-
quishment of the premises before the landlord can claim abandon-
ment.' 8 The landlord can seek an action in ejectment for posses-
sion of the premises in cases where the tenant has discontinued
business, but continues to pay base rent.' 89 In Ingannamorte v.
Kings Super Markets, Inc.,' 90 the landlord sought possession of
183. 280 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1955).
184. Id. at 781.
185. 359 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
186. 30 N.C. App. 84, 226 S.E.2d 232 (1976), accord Downtown Assoc., Ltd. v.
Burrows Bros. Co., 518 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
187. Kearns v. Gay, 232 F.Supp 475, 479 (M.D.N.C. 1964).
188. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
189. Century Shopping Center Fund I v. Crivello, 456 N.W.2d 858 (Wis.
1990), petition for review denied; WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 5, at §
81.
190. 260 A.2d 841 (N.J. 1970).
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the premises when the tenant discontinued operations of a super-
market but continued to pay monthly rent. The court ordered pos-
session in favor of the landlord unless the tenant resumed super-
market operations at the leased premises within thirty days.191
In North Carolina, statute controls a summary ejectment.19 2
The landlord is the proper person to bring a summary ejectment
action. The statute sets forth two situations under which a sum-
mary ejectment action can be brought: if the tenant has held over
possession of the leased premises after the term has expired, or if
any act occurred which caused the estate to cease. The landlord
must file a complaint asking to be put into possession of the leased
premises.19 The clerk of court issues a summons for tenant to ap-
pear and answer within ten days.
If the tenant denies the allegations, a magistrate hears the
case. 94 The decision of the magistrate is appealable to the district
court. If the landlord prevails, a writ of possession is executed.'95
The tenant, upon notice of execution, has seven days to remove
himself and his property from the leased premises. The sheriff is
then authorized to remove the tenant's property and lock the
premises if the tenant does not comply with the writ.' 9"
B. Equitable Remedies
The use of equitable relief to remedy a breach of a commercial
leasehold is often sought, but rarely granted. Injunctive relief such
as specific performance, forfeiture and restitution are examples of
the actions pursued today.
A party seeking equitable relief must prove to the court that it
is necessary. Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy. Such re-
lief will not be granted unless the party shows good cause. 9 ' There
must be a threshold finding of irreparable harm. "Injunctive relief
is not available unless irreparable injury is proven .... The danger
sought to be enjoined must be real and immediate."' 98 The party
191. Id. at 842.
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-26 to § 42-36.2 (1991).
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-28 (1991).
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-31 (1991).
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-36.2 (1991).
196. Id.
197. CBL & Assoc., Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 761 F. Supp. 807, 808 (M.D. Ga.
1991).
198. Asheville Mall, Inc. v. Sam Wyche Sports World, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 133,
135, 387 S.E.2d 70, 71 (1990); accord Bradlees Tidewater, Inc. v. Walnut Hill Inv.,
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seeking 'equity must have clean hands. Damages must be specula-
tive or difficult to prove. In Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Ricther's Jew-
elry Co.,199 the court stated "that it would be impracticable if not
impossible, to establish the damage to the lessor, or the lessee, re-
sulting from a breach of the covenant and that the remedy at law
would, therefore, not be adequate. '2 00
Additionally, the party who is to perform must have the ca-
pacity to perform. In Lorch, Inc. v. Bessemer Hall Shopping
Center, Inc.,201 the court denied injunctive relief when the tenant
could not perform.0 2 Also, to receive injunctive relief, there must
be no adequate relief at law. In Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Cushman's Sons Inc., °3 the court looked at the loss to the land-
lord of percentage sales, and the difficulty in measuring harm that
would come from the withdrawal of the "semi-cooperative enter-
prise" like a shopping center, stating that "[p]laintiff's damages
cannot therefore be accurately ascertained and a remedy by way of
damages at law would be impracticable and unsatisfactory. '20 4
If day-to-day supervision is required, the court will deny a re-
quest for specific performance. The court will also deny mandatory
compliance with the order if a protracted or repeated intervention
by the court is likely. "Courts are reluctant to grant specific per-
formance in situations where such performance would require judi-
cial supervision over a long period of time. ' 20 5 In CBL & Assoc.,
Inc. v. McCrory Corp.,0 6 the court asserted that even if they were
prepared to assume the responsibility of that length [nine years],
Inc., 391 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 1990); CBL & Assoc., Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 761 F.
Supp. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1991); New Park Forest Assoc. II v. Rogers Enterprises, Inc.,
552 N.E.2d 1215, cert. denied 561 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
199. 12 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1943).
200. 1d. at 454. Accord Asheville Mall Inc. v. Sam Wyche Sports World, Inc.,
97 N.C. App. 133, 135, 387 S.E.2d 70, 71 (1990).
201. 310 So.2d 872 (Ala. 1975).
202. But see Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Ricther's Jewelry Co., Inc., 12 So.2d 452
(Fla. 1943)(the court granted injunctive relief, finding the tenant could perform).
203. 164 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super 1960).
204. Id. at 791. Accord Washington Trust Bank v. Circle K Corp., 546 P.2d
1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976); CBL & Assoc., Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 761 F. Supp.
807 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Ricther's Jewelry Co., Inc., 12 So.2d
452 (Fla. 1943).
205. Grossman v. Wegman's Food Markets. Inc., 43 A.D.2d 813, 350 N.Y.S.2d
484, 485 (1973)(the court denied injunctive relief when the remaining lease term
was 12 years).
206. 761 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
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the exact nature of what the court would have to do is unclear. To
justify ordering specific performance, the contract must be
* definite, certain and clear, and so precise in its terms as to the
thing or things to be done by the party whose performance is
sought .... 207
Two state courts of appeal found an implied covenant to con-
tinuously operate in the presence of broad assignment and sublet-
ting provisions and affirmed trial court orders forfeiting the lease-
hold and allowing restitution of the premises to the landlord. 208
Both of these cases are against the great weight of authority hold-
ing that leases are strictly construed against forfeiture. 20 9
Many leases now contain provisions for the payment of attor-
ney's fees. Generally, these clauses provide that the losing party
pays. 10 The Maryland Court of Appeals recently pro-rated costs
nine-tenths to the losing party and one-tenth to the prevailing
party.1  Also, some jurisdictions interpret statutes to allow attor-
ney's fees and costs to be awarded to the prevailing party.2"2
The North Carolina rule can be found in Stillwell Enterprises,
Inc. v. Interstate Equipment Co.,213 which sets forth the proposi-
tion that attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless specifically au-
thorized by statute. "Even in the face of a carefully drafted con-
tractual provision indemnifying a party for such attorney's fees as
may be necessitated by a successful action on the contract itself,
our courts have consistently refused to sustain such award absent
statutory authority therefor."" The Stillwell court found the req-
uisite statutory authority for attorney's fees under N.C. GEN. STAT.
207. CBL & Assoc., 761 F. Supp. at 808. Accord New Park Forest Assoc. II v.
Rogers Enterprises, Inc., 552 N.E.2d 1215, cert. denied 561 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990). But see Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons Inc., 164 A.2d
785, 790 (N.J. Super. 1960) (where the landlord waived judicial supervision relying
on the tenant's self-interest in continuing to preserve its good reputation).
208. Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1989), cert
denied, (1990). First Amer. Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d
938, rev. denied (Ariz. 1986).
209. Davis v. Wickline, 135 S.E.2d 812 (Va. 1964).
210. Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 772 P.2d 1284 (Nev. 1989); Jer-
rico, Inc. v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 400 So.2d 1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
211. Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Fry, 587 A.2d 527, 531 (Md. 1991).
212. First Amer. Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d 938, rev.
denied (Ariz. 1986).
213. 300 N.C. 286, 266 S.E.2d 812 (1980) (citing Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C.
236, 200 S.E.2d 40 (1972)).
214. Id. at 289, 266 S.E.2d at 814.
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§ 6-21.2. This statute validates an obligation to pay attorney's fees
upon a note, conditional sale contract or other evidence of indebt-
edness. The court held that a lease for specific goods (pushloading
scraper) was other evidence of indebtedness.2 '1 5
Prior to adoption of the statute, North Carolina courts ruled
that payment of attorney's fees incurred in collection and breach
of contract cases was against public policy and unenforceable. This
rule prevails even though the contract contained an express provi-
sion allowing such payment.21 6
VIII. UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
Unfair trade practices in North Carolina are governed by stat-
ute.17 Pertinent parts read as follows:
75-1.1 (a) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce are unlawful.
(b) For purposes of this section, commerce includes all business
activities....
75-16 If any person shall be injured or the business of any person,
firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by
reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm, or cor-
poration in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such per-
son, firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on
account of such injury done and if damages are assessed in such
case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
Case law provides some direction on what is an unfair and de-
ceptive trade practice. In Marshall v. Miller,"1 8 the supreme court
says that "whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive depends
on the facts of each case and the impact [the acts have] on the
market place." ' 9 One must not look only at the acts of the parties,
but the effect of those acts on the consuming public. "A practice is
unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the
practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or sub-
215. Id. at 294, 266 S.E.2d at 818.
216. Kearns v. Gay, 232 F.Supp 475, 479 (M.D.N.C. 1964)(citing Parker v.
Mecklenburg Realty Co., 195 N.C. 644, 143 S.E. 254 (1928)).
217. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1991).
218. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
219. Id. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
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stantially injurious to consumers. '' O
- Few cases deal specifically with unfair and deceptive acts in-
volving commercial leases. In Love v. Pressley,221 the court of ap-
peals decided that trespass and conversion of property by a land-
lord could constitute unfair and deceptive practices. Although
Love involved a rental of residential housing, this principal was ap-
plied in Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd. (Mosley
II),222 which involved a commercial lease. In Mosley H, as in Love,
the landlord entered the premises and physically removed tenant's
merchandise and property from the rented premises. At the time
of the eviction, the tenant was in rightful possession of the prem-
ises. 223 Testimony was allowed showing that the landlord negoti-
ated with another tenant while plaintiff was in possession. These
actions were sufficient to support plaintiff's claim for unfair and
deceptive trade practices.
In Spinks v. Taylor,224 the landlord's padlocking of leased
premises for failure to pay rent was not an unfair and deceptive
trade practice. Although this case involved a residential lease, the
same principle would most likely apply to a commercial lease.
A tendency to deceive is enough to violate the statute. Proof of
actual deception is not required.225 In Marshall v. Miller,226 the de-
fendant rented mobile home sites to residents in a development
that was to include sports facilities, yard care and paved streets.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant misrepresented to plain-
tiff the services that were to be supplied. The jury found that the
defendant led the plaintiff to believe that the services would be
furnished. The trial judge concluded as a matter of law that these
acts constituted unfair and deceptive acts or practices.2 2
Procedurally, it is the province of the jury to find the facts of
the case. The determination of whether the acts are unfair or de-
ceptive is a question of law for the court.2 ' In this case, the North
Carolina Attorney General filed a motion for reconsideration peti-
220. Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262-263, 266
S.E.2d 610, 621 (1980).
221. 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977).
222. 97 N.C. App 511, 389 S.E.2d 576 (1990).
223. Mosley H, at 519, 389 S.E.2d at 580.
224. 303 N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981).
225. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).
226. Id. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
227. Id. at 551, 276 S.E.2d at 398.
228. Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 516, 239 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1977).
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tioning the supreme court to review the court of appeal's holding
that proof of bad faith is required to establish a violation of N.C.
GEN. STAT.. § 75-1.1 [hereinafter, 75-1.1].
The N.C. Supreme Court held that a practice is unfair when it
has the capacity to deceive and has an impact on the marketplace.
The intent of the actor is irrelevant. "This is consistent with the
Federal interpretation under 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1), Sec. 5 of the FTC
act. ' 229 State courts have generally ruled that if the act had a ten-
dency or capacity to mislead or created a likelihood of deception, it
is unfair and deceptive.
Nevertheless, in Libby Hill Seafood Restaurant, Inc. v.
Owen, 3 the court held that the actions of the victim could be ma-
terial.23 1 Libby Hill involved a commercial development, not a
lease. The plaintiff, Libby Hill, purchased a piece of property from
the defendant. The structure that was built on the property devel-
oped cracks, deteriorated and was razed. Libby Hill claimed fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty and a violation of
75-1.1. The property was previously owned by the City of Winston-
Salem and was used as trash dump for 35 years. The defendant
knew about the dump on the property and told plaintiff about it
before the plaintiff purchased the property.
No independent studies were performed on the soil. The
plaintiff relied on defendant's statement that the dump was not
near the proposed building site. The court found the plaintiff's evi-
dence insufficient to support a claim for unfair and deceptive trade
practices. "A party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it
engages in conduct that amounts to an inequitable assertion of its
power or position. '122 The plaintiff was a sophisticated buyer and
should have verified the defendant's assertions. The defendant
could not have asserted inequitable power over the plaintiff.
Additionally, the plaintiff in Libby Hill claimed fraud. Fraud
is a separate action from a violation of unfair and deceptive trade
practices. Although a finding of fraud can constitute a violation of
the act, the converse is not always true.233 The same course of con-
duct can support a claim for fraud and for unfair and deceptive
229. Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 265-66, 266
S.E.2d 610, 622 (1980).
230. 62 N.C. App. 695, 303 S.E.2d 565 (1983).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 700, 303 S.E. at 569.
233. Winston-Realty Co., Inc. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677
(1985).
1992] 311
37
Tyson: Drafting, Interpreting, and Enforcing Commercial and Shopping Cen
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
trade practices. Recovery can only be had on one claim, not
both.234 Similarly, proof of conduct violative of the Sherman Act is
proof sufficient to establish a violation of the unfair and deceptive
trade practices statute.3 5
Tortious injury to business can also be grounds for unfair and
deceptive .trade practices. In Century Shopping Center Fund I v.
Crivello,236 the court allowed a claim for tortious injury to business
under Wisconsin law. The complaint alleged that the tenant nego-
tiated with the landlord of a nearby shopping center for a new
store and agreed to keep the Century store dark to avoid competi-
tion with the new shopping center. The lease with Century con-
tained a mandatory use clause: specifically for a food store. The
plaintiff, Century, filed a breach of lease claim when the tenant
closed the food store, left it vacant and re-opened nearby. The trial
court upheld a claim for breach of lease and tortious injury to busi-
ness. In Wisconsin, violation thereof is punishable by one year im-
prisonment or by $500.00 fine.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina has held that tortious interference with a contract
could constitute an unfair method of competition or an unfair act
under 75-1.1. In the final disposition of American Craft Hosiery
Corp. v. Damascus Hosiery Mills, Inc., there were not enough facts
to support such a claim.23 7 There is not a North Carolina decision
dealing with a commercial lease under this issue.
Under N.C. GEN. STAT. 75-1.1(b) the unfair or deceptive acts
must affect "Commerce." Commerce includes virtually all business
activity. In Kent v. Humphries,238 the court held that the rental of
commercial property is trade or commerce within the meaning of
the statute. Similarly, in Wilder v. Hodges, the leasing of a com-
mercial lot satisfies the requirement of "being in or affecting com-
merce." The rental of spaces in a mobile home park was considered
trade and commerce in Marshall v. Miller.23 9
In Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc.,2 40 the court found that
234. Wilder v. Hodges, 80 N.C. App 333, 342 S.E.2d 57 (1986).
235. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1991).
236. 456 N.W.2d 858, petition for review denied (Wis. 1990).
237. American Craft Hosiery Corp. v. Damascus Hosiery Mills, Inc., 575 F.
Supp 816, 821 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
238. Kent. v. Humphries, 50 N.C. App 580, 275 S.E.2d 176, aff'd and modi-
fied, 303 N.C. 675, 281 S.E.2d 43 (1981).
239. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
240. 386 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1989), cert denied, (1990).
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a commercial tenant had violated an implied covenant of continu-
ous operation by closing its supermarket, keeping the premises va-
cant to avoid competition and moving to a nearby shopping center.
The court denied plaintiff's claim for unfair and deceptive trade
practices under South Carolina law because the acts of the tenant
did not have an impact upon the public interest. "The act is not
available to redress a private wrong where the public interest is
unaffected." '41 In North Carolina, the court in Marshall v. Miller
and American Craft Hosiery Corp. v: Damascus Hosiery Mills,
Inc.,24 2 emphasize that N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1 and 75-16 are in-
tended to create a private remedy for aggrieved consumers. Section
75-16 authorizes recovery of treble damages for violations of § 75-
1.1. Recovery is allowed for injury to a business, a corporation or a
person, by violations of this act.
Few defenses are available to an allegation of unfair and de-
ceptive trade acts. The controlling case is Winston-Realty Co., Inc.
v. G.H.G. Inc. This case held that contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff is not a defense to a violation of § 75-1.1. Win-
ston-Realty involved acts of an employment agency. The agency
advertised that it pre-screened all applicants. The plaintiff, Win-
ston-Realty, used the defendant employment agency, G.H.G., Inc.
and hired a person that the agency recommended. The employee
was indicted on charges of embezzlement from the plaintiff. The
plaintiff learned that the employee had a history of worthless
checks, forgery and embezzlement. The plaintiff sued the defend-
ant for violation of § 75-1.1. The court held that the defendant was
guilty. The defendant pleaded contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff, relying on Libby Hill Seafood Restaurant, Inc. v.
Owen.
The court distinguished Libby Hill on the grounds that it was
not a contributory negligence case and that the language relied on
by the defendant is dicta. The court cites N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16
as the remedy for violation of § 75-1.1 noting an absence of con-
tributory negligence language. For purposes of a commercial lease
though, this case needs to be scrutinized. Libby Hill involved com-
mercial property, not a lease. Winston-Realty addresses actions of
an employment agency. Libby Hill was not overruled by the N.C.
241. Columbia East Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 263, cert denied,
(S.C. 1990).
242. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981); American Craft
Hosiery Corp. v. Damascus Hosiery Mills, Inc. 575 F. Supp 816 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
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Supreme Court, although Winston-Realty presented the court with
the opportunity.
Similarly, the defendant's good faith is not a defense to a vio-
lation of unfair and deceptive trade practices.243 What is relevant
is the effect of the actor's conduct on the consuming public. The
Marshall v. Miller court explained that there is no "bad faith lan-
guage" in the North Carolina version of the statute, but that sister
states have incorporated such language.244
Under N.C. GEN STAT. § 75-16 the court awards treble damages
for a violation of § 75-1.1 automatically.2 " Since a plaintiff cannot
recover under a claim of fraud and a claim of unfair and deceptive
trade practices, the plaintiff must choose between an award for pu-
nitive damages or treble damages. The Marshall court looks to the
purpose of the statute and explains that treble damages makes the
statute more enforceable and it increases incentives in reaching
settlements.2 46
N.C. GEN STAT. § 75-16.1 also provides for reasonable attorney
fees upon a specific finding that defendant willfully violated § 75-
1.1. Attorney fees may also be awarded if a plaintiff brings a frivo-
lous or malicious action. An award for attorney fees is under the
sound discretion of the trial judge.
X. CONCLUSION
The tenant and the landlord must carefully review the options
that are available when negotiating and drafting a commercial
lease. Specific lease provisions can be tailored to fit the needs of
the parties. Otherwise, some covenants or obligations should be ex,
pressly negated to prevent the risk of the courts implying a cove-
nant where neither party has contemplated or intended its
existence.
243. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).
244. Id.
245. Mosley & Mosley Builders, Inc. v. Landin Ltd., 97 N.C. App 511, 521,
389 S.E.2d 576, 582 (1990) (Mosley II).
246. Marshall, at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 404.
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SAMPLE LEASE PROVISIONS
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
ARTICLE _. Landlord warrants and represents to Tenant
that:
(i) Landlord has not leased any space in the shopping center
for use as a drugstore, health and beauty aid store, a
beauty supply store or for the operation of a pharmacy;
(ii) Landlord will not hereafter lease any space in the
shopping center for use as a drugstore, health and beauty
aid store, a beauty supply store or operation of a
pharmacy; and
(iii) Landlord will not permit any tenant or occupant in the
shopping center to operate a drugstore, health and beauty
aid store, a beauty supply store or pharmacy.
The foregoing restrictions shall be applicable for so long as the
Premises are operated as a drugstore with a pharmacy. The forego-
ing restrictions shall not prohibit the sale of health and beauty aid
items by the supermarket and the general merchandise retailer as
an incidental part of their respective businesses except that in no
event shall they sell any product or service requiring the presence
of a licensed or registered pharmacist.
Landlord further warrants and represents to Tenant that the
shopping center will at all times be used only for retail and service
stores and that within 150 feet of the Premises and within the area
outlined in green on Exhibit B, no skating rink, bingo parlor, bow-
ling alley, motion picture or legitimate theater, business or profes-
sional offices in excess of ten (10) percent of the total floor area of
the shopping center, automobile or motorcycle sales, cocktail
lounge, schools or training facilities, health, entertainment or rec-
reational type activities or non-retail or non-service type activities
shall be permitted.
Tenant shall have the right to enforce the provisions of this
Article by termination of this Lease or appropriate injunctive or
other equitable relief.
USE AND OPERATION
1. (a) Tenant shall use and occupy the demised premises
solely for the purpose of operating a drugstore with a pharmacy.
During the term of this Lease Agreement, and every extension
thereof, Tenant shall not directly or indirectly, conduct any busi-
ness within two (2) miles of the demised premises in competition
41
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with any business being conducted in the demised premises.
(b) Tenant shall operate all of the demised premises with due
diligence and efficiency so as to produce all of the gross receipts
which may be produced by such manner of operation, unless pre-
vented from doing so by causes beyond Tenant's control. Subject
to inability by reason of strikes or labor disputes, and during the
time Tenant shall be required to be open for business, Tenant
shall carry on its business in said premises in such manner as shall
be reasonably designed to produce the maximum return to Tenant.
(c) Tenant shall devote the maximum possible floor area of the
demised premises to the conduct of its business, and shall not use
any portion of the demised premises for storage or other services,
except for its operations in the demised premises.
PERCENTAGE RENTS
2. In addition to the payment of fixed rent herein reserved,
Tenant agrees to pay Landlord as percentage rent for each lease
year, the amount equal to of annual gross re-
ceipts as herein defined in excess of
As used herein, the term "lease year", shall be determined as
follows:
(i) The first lease year shall commence on the first day of the
calendar month next following the tenancy date and terminate on
the last day of the twelfth month thereafter.
(ii) Succeeding lease years shall each consist of the twelve
month period, commencing on the first day of the month following
the termination of the prior lease year.
The term, "gross receipts", as used herein is defined as gross
sales of Tenant from the demised premises, whether such sales be
evidenced by cash, check, credit or charge accounts. Gross receipts
shall not include the amount of any sales, use, excise, gross receipts
or other tax imposed by any federal, state, municipal or other gov-
ernmental authority.
This Agreement shall not be construed more strongly. against
any party regardless of who was more responsible for its
preparation.
All rights, powers and remedies provided herein may be exer-
cised only to the extent that the exercise thereof does not violate
any applicable laws and are intended to be limited to the extent
necessary so that they will not render this Agreement invalid or
unenforceable. If any term of this Agreement shall be held to be
invalid, illegal, or unenforceable, the validity of the other terms of
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this Agreement shall in no way be affected thereby.
This Agreement may be executed in any number of counter-
parts, each of which, when so executed and delivered, shall be an
original, but each counterpart shall together constitute one and the
same instrument.
ABANDONMENT
ARTICLE _. In the event that Tenant voluntarily and per-
manently (i.e. removal of furniture, fixtures and merchandise)
closes the Premises for a period in excess of sixty (60) days (except
for reasons of casualty, rebuilding, repairing, refixturing), Landlord
shall have the right to terminate this Lease at any time prior to
the re-opening of the Premises by giving written notice to Tenant.
Temporary cessation of operations to make alterations or circum-
stances beyond the control of tenant, and in any event cessation
for a period of less than sixty (60) consecutive days, shall not be
considered a discontinuance of operations.
In the event Tenant shall vacate the demised premises or
cease selling merchandise therein for a period in excess of six (6)
months (except for remodeling or repairs) during any lease year of
the term of this lease agreement or any options herein, while the
demised premises are usable for the operation of a general mercan-
tile business (excluding temporary cessation of business caused by
fire or other casualty) Landlord shall have a ninety (90) day option
to cancel this lease beginning the following day after the expiration
of the six (6) months closing period and expiring ninety (90) days
thereafter (unless Tenant shall have reoccupied the premises or
subleased the premises as provided herein). Notwithstanding the
foregoing, in the event Landlord exercises its right to terminate
and cancel the lease, then it shall pay to Tenant, in consideration
for such termination and cancellation, the total amount of the
-fixed rent reserved for the balance of the then unexpired term of
the lease reduced to present worth, using as a criteria a discount
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. For example, if, at the time
Landlord exercises its right to cancel and terminate this lease and
there are twenty (20) months remaining and the rental per month
is $15,000.00, then the amount to be paid by Landlord to Tenant
shall be $300,000.00, discounted to present worth at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum for the twenty (20) month period.
1992]
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OPTION TO EXTEND
ARTICLE _. Tenant is hereby given the right to extend the
term of this Lease for three (3) additional periods of five (5) years
each, upon the same terms, conditions and rent as provided in the
original term of this Lease, upon the condition that Tenant notifies
Landlord in writing of its intention to extend at least one hundred
eighty (180) days prior to the date of commencement of each such
extension term and thereupon, this Lease shall be so extended
without the execution of any further document. In the event that
Tenant fails to timely notify Landlord of its exercise of any exten-
sion option, such option(s) to extend shall nevertheless remain in
full force and effect for a period of thirty (30) days after receipt of
notice from Landlord advising of the date upon which the term of
the Lease will expire or stating that a notice exercising an option
to extend has not been received.
DRUG STORE LEASE
Percentage Rent.(a) Tenant shall pay as percentage rent (the "Percentage
Rent") a sum equal to the amount, if any, by which two and three
fourths percent (23 %) of all gross sales, as hereinafter defined,
made in any Lease Year, as hereinafter defined, exceeds Annual
Minimum Rent payable during such Lease Year pursuant to Sec-
tion __.
(b) The term "gross sales" shall mean the gross sales of mer-
chandise, at retail or at wholesale, made by Tenant on, at or from
the Demised Premises, whether sold for cash or on a charge basis,
collected or uncollected, sold or contracted to be sold, at, from or
through the Demised Premises, including any commissions,
charges or fees received by Tenant for services performed within
the Demised Premises, and receipts from the operation of coin-op-
erated machines and telephones (this being intended not to be the
actual deposits in the telephones and coin-operated machines, but
the percentage thereof actually received by Tenant); provided,
however, the term "gross sales", as herein used, shall exclude:
(i) receipts from sales to Tenant's employees at a discount;
(ii) credits or refunds to customers for merchandise returned
or exchanged;
(iii) receipts from sales in the nature of a transfer to other
stores operated by Tenant or its affiliated companies;
(iv) sales from Tenant's tobacco, wine and beer departments;
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(v) any sales, excise or similar tax imposed by governmental
authority;
(vi) bulk sales; and
(vii) sales of fixtures and equipment.
(c) Tenant covenants and agrees that it will furnish Landlord
with a statement showing its gross sales for each Lease Year within
thirty (30) days after the close thereof, and the Percentage Rent
due for such Lease Year shall be paid with such annual statement.
Landlord shall not, without Tenant's prior written consent, dis-
close any such sales information to third parties at any time.
(d) Tenant further agrees that it will keep separate and accu-
rate records of all gross sales made in, at, upon and from the De-
mised Premises, in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles; and that it will give Landlord the right, upon three (3)
days' written notice and at any and all reasonable hours, to inspect
such records and any other books or records which may be neces-
sary to enable Landlord, or a representative of Landlord, to make
a full and proper audit of the gross sales for the preceding Lease
Year. If Landlord does not make such an audit within one (1) year
from the close of any Lease Year, the statement of annual gross
sales furnished for any such Lease Year shall be deemed to be cor-
rect, and Landlord shall have no right thereafter to contest the
same.
(e) The term "Lease Year" is hereby defined as follows: The
first Lease Year during the Term shall be the period commencing
on the Rent Commencement Date and terminating on:
(i) the day before the first anniversary of the Rent Commence-
ment Date if the Rent Commencement Date is the first day of a
month, or
(ii) the last day of the 12th full calendar month following the
Rent Commencement Date if the Rent Commencement Date is not
the first day of a month.
Each subsequent Lease Year during the Term shall commence on
the day immediately following the last day of the preceding Lease
Year and shall continue for a period of twelve (12) full calendar
months, except that the last Lease Year during the Term shall ter-
minate on the date that this Lease is terminated.
(f) Tenant makes no representation or warranty as to its ex-
pected sales in the Demised Premises.
PERCENTAGE RENTAL CLAUSE - SUPERMARKET
In addition to payment of fixed rent herein reserved, Tenant
1992] 319
45
Tyson: Drafting, Interpreting, and Enforcing Commercial and Shopping Cen
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
agrees to pay Landlord as percentage rent for each lease year, the
amount, if any, by which one percent (1%) of annual gross receipts
as herein defined exceeds the fixed rent. As used herein, the term,
"lease year", shall be determined as follows:
(i) The first lease year shall commence on the first day of the
calendar month next following the commencement and expire on
the last day of the twelfth month thereafter.
(ii) Each subsequent lease year shall commence on the date fol-
lowing the expiration of the preceding lease year and shall end at
the expiration of twelve (12) calendar months thereafter or upon
this lease, as the case may be.
The term, "gross receipts", as used herein is defined as gross
sales in or from the leased premises, whether such sales are evi-
denced by check, credit or charge account and including telephone
sales and orders received in or from the premises, although such
orders may be filled elsewhere, all of which shall be net of charge
account fee, exchange or otherwise. Gross receipts shall not include
transfers to affiliated stores or companies, sales of merchandise for
which cash has been refunded, allowances on merchandise claimed
to be defective or unsatisfactory, bad debts, service charges on bad
checks, revenues generated from video games, vending machines,
shampoo machines, or in-store automatic teller machines. Gross re-
ceipts shall not include the amount of any sales, use or gross re-
ceipt tax imposed by a federal, state, municipal or other govern-
mental authority, further, gross receipts shall not include the sale
of tobacco products. Landlord and Tenant agree that Tenant shall
be entitled to estimate the sale of tobacco products based on prod-
uct movement, inasmuch as tobacco products cannot be rung up as
a separate department sale.
Within ninety (90) days after the end of each calendar year or
termination or expiration of this lease, Tenant shall deliver to
Landlord a statement of gross receipts for the preceding calendar
year and pay to Landlord the full amount of percentage rent paya-
ble to Landlord for the period of such statement. Tenant shall
keep at the demised premises or at its general office complete and
accurate books of account and records in accordance with accepted
accounting practices with respect to all business conducted in the
demised premises excluding books and records pertaining to items
not included in gross sales. Upon reasonable prior written notice to
Tenant, Landlord may, at its own cost, have Tenant's books and
records for the previous year inspected or audited by a certified
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public accountant of Landlord's selection at reasonable times dur-
ing Tenant's business hours for the purpose of verifying Tenant's
gross receipts only for the previous year. If an examination or au-
dit by Landlord shall disclose any deficiency of more than three
percent (3%) in the annual statement of gross receipt, then Tenant
shall pay Landlord the reasonable cost of examination or audit.
Tenant makes no representations or warranties as to the sales
which it expects to make in the leased premises, and Landlord
agrees to hold in confidence all sales information obtained from
Tenant or upon the inspections and audit of Tenant's books and
records, except that Landlord may disclose Tenant's sales figures
to Landlord's mortgages as reasonably required.
EXCLUSIVE SUPERMARKET
During the term of this lease or any renewals thereof, neither
Landlord, its successors, assigns, representatives, nor heirs, will
lease, rent or occupy, or permit to be occupied, any premises
owned or controlled by Landlord which are within one (1) mile of
herein leased premises, to be used for a supermarket, convenience
food store, or
1) the sale of packaged or fresh seafood, meat, or poultry for
off-premises consumption;
2) the sale of packaged or fresh produce or vegetables for off-
premises consumption;
3) the sale of dairy products (excluding cone ice cream) for off-
premises consumption;
4) the sale of packaged or fresh bakery products for off-prem-
ises consumption; or
5) the sale of grocery items, or any of them, unless such prem-
ises are presently so occupied.
Neither shall Landlord sell or otherwise convey any such
premises without imposing thereon a restriction to secure compli-
ance herewith. This covenant shall run with the land. Landlord ac-
knowledges that in the event of breach hereof Tenant's remedies at
law would be inadequate and in such event Tenant shall be enti-
tled to cancel this lease, or to full and adequate relief by injunc-
tion, or otherwise, at Tenant's option. The parties hereto agree
that Tenant is entitled to know what it is "buying" when it is ne-
gotiating this lease agreement, that specifically it is material as to
how many supermarkets will be in this shopping center or any ex-
tensions thereof. Rental and other considerations are negotiated
based upon Landlord's representations to Tenant that there will
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be only one supermarket in this shopping center or extensions
thereof.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
ARTICLE -. If suit shall be brought for recovery of posses-
sion of the premises, rent or any other amount due under the pro-
visions of this Lease, or due to a breach of any covenant herein
contained on the part of Tenant or Landlord to be kept or per-
formed, and a breach shall be established, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to its reasonable and necessary expense incurred
therefor, including reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
ARTICLE -. Landlord recognizes that in the usual course of
a drugstore operation, Tenant may use, store and sell in the Prem-
ises hazardous and toxic substances as the same are defined by ap-
plicable local, state and federal laws and regulations. Tenant shall
indemnify and hold harmless Landlord from any and all claims,
damages, fines, judgments, penalties, cost, liabilities or losses aris-
ing as a result of any such use, sale, storage, disposal or contamina-
tion by such substances to the Premises caused by Tenant, its
agents and employees. This clause shall survive the expiration or
termination of this Lease.
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